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Summary 
The reduction of poverty, and more recently inequality, are pressing concerns in many low- 
and middle-income countries, not in the least as a result of the Sustainable Development 
Goals committing countries to significant improvements by 2030. Redistribution is important 
for reaching these goals, and is shaped by countries’ tax and welfare systems. Despite 
redistribution resulting from the simultaneous effect of revenue collection and public 
expenditures, policies and analyses of their distributional effects have largely been 
undertaken from narrow and singular perspectives. In this paper, we aim to jointly assess the 
distributional effect of taxes and transfers (through social protection) using Ethiopia as a 
case study. We find that currently Ethiopia’s flagship social protection programme is more 
effective than income taxation in achieving poverty reduction, while neither policy achieves a 
sizeable reduction in overall inequality. Overall, our findings provide support for the common 
belief that social spending is more suitable than taxation to achieve redistribution. We also 
assessed whether Ethiopia would have the capacity to achieve the desired level of 
redistribution by applying higher marginal rates on relatively high incomes. Our results 
suggest that Ethiopia does not currently have the capacity to close the poverty gap, or to 
fully fund its main safety net programme using domestic income sources alone.  
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There is an increased acknowledgement of the importance of joint assessments of tax policy 
and social protection to understand the overall progressivity of public policies and the extent 
to which they contribute to reductions in poverty and inequality (Engel et al. 1999; Bird and 
Zolt 2005; IMF 2011). The existing evidence from low-income countries suggests that social 
protection is effective in reducing poverty and inequality (Bird and Zolt 2005; Gemmell and 
Morrissey 2005). Taxation is seen to be less effective due to large informal sectors and heavy 
reliance on indirect taxes that are often only mildly progressive or even regressive (Muñoz and 
Cho 2003; Bird and Zolt 2005; Emran and Stiglitz 2005; Bastagli 2015). Moreover, there is 
mounting evidence from the African continent showing that tax systems that are proportional 
or progressive on paper may still end up being regressive in practice (Mascagni and Mengistu 
2016; Mascagni et al. 2016). In terms of the progressivity of expenditures, an expanding 
evidence base speaks to the effectiveness of social protection, and particularly cash transfers, 
to tackle poverty and inequality (Cornia and Martorano 2012; Roelen et al. 2016). The common 
policy prescription is therefore that taxation should mostly focus on generating revenue for 
social spending (Bird and Zolt 2005).  
This narrative is largely based on literature that studies redistributive impacts of taxation and 
social expenditures separately. Meanwhile, the evidence on the joint distributional effect of tax 
and social protection in low-income countries remains limited—although progress has recently 
been made using the Commitment to Equity methodology (Lustig and Higgins 2013).1 
Taxation has redistributive effects related to the way in which revenues are both collected and 
spent. Similarly, social protection is, at least partly, funded through taxes that can boost or 
decrease its net effect on poverty and inequality. Moreover, the sustainability of social 
protection requires a stable resource base, particularly in light of efforts to scale up social 
protection programmes and systems (Devereux et al. 2015). Tax revenue is already one of 
the most important revenue bases for social protection (Bastagli 2015). It is also the only 
source of financing that would make these programmes viable in the context of long-term 
independence from foreign aid (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). 2  However, most low-income 
countries often do not have the capacity to fund their own development programmes, most 
notably the eradication of poverty, with taxation alone (Ravallion 2010).  
Against this background, this paper attempts to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, 
we aim to analyse and compare the effectiveness of income taxes and social protection on 
redistribution and poverty reduction in Ethiopia. Using a relatively simple microsimulation 
model, we evaluate both current and reformed policies. Second, building on Ravallion (2010), 
we critically assess the potential and limitations of taxation as a sustainable source of funding 
for poverty reduction, through and beyond social protection. By doing this, we aim to establish 
                                                 
1 The Commitment to Equity (CEQ) methodology takes a more comprehensive view of the fiscal system and is used to analyse 
the redistributive effect of taxation and social spending in countries (Lustig and Higgins 2013). For example, Inchauste et al. 
(2015) find taxes and transfers to be progressive in South Africa, reducing inequality by 0.14 units (or 14 percentage points) in 
2010/11. Similar impacts are found in Argentina, with the Gini coefficient reducing by 0.12 units (or 12 percentage points after 
taking into account indirect subsidies, taxes and in-kind transfers (Lustig et al. 2012). By contrast, while cash transfers in Bolivia 
and Brazil were found to significantly reduce poverty, the regressivity of consumption taxes offset any distributional impact (Lustig 
et al. 2013). Based on the same method, a recent World Bank study shows that in Ethiopia the combination of taxes and transfers 
reduces the Gini coefficient only by 0.02 units (or 2 percentage points) (World Bank 2015a). 
2 The Addis Tax Initiative, launched in July 2015 and signed by a number of low-income countries together with donors, 
acknowledges this importance of domestic revenue collection for development. The initiative aims to improve transparency, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of tax systems in the participating low-income countries. More information can be found at 
www.addistaxinitiative.net. 
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a link between taxation and social protection that we believe is still largely under-researched 
in the literature.  
Ethiopia offers an interesting location for this case study. First, it is a low-income country that 
has experienced fast economic growth—annual GDP growth averaging 10 per cent over the 
last decade (World Bank 2015b).3 This growth was led by a strong performance of the 
agricultural sector and, as a result, poverty rates declined rapidly, though, in absolute terms, 
still remain high (World Bank 2015b).4 Moreover, while income inequality has remained low 
(World Bank 2015b), the ongoing structural transformation of the economy5 (Martins 2014; 
World Bank 2015b) is expected to widen the income distribution in the country (Seid et al. 
2015). Therefore, redistribution is likely to have an important role in the future if Ethiopia is to 
maintain its low-income inequality and track-record in reducing poverty.6  
Our analysis focuses on two policy tools in Ethiopia: personal income taxation and the 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The focus on income taxation is motivated by a 
recent reform, approved by the Ethiopian Parliament in July 2016 that involves substantial 
changes in the progressive structure of rates. It is therefore timely to assess its redistributive 
potential compared to the previous tax system. In terms of spending, the PSNP represents 
one of the largest social protection schemes in sub-Saharan Africa (Slater and McCord 2013).  
Based on the PSNP’s success (see Berhane et al. 2014), the programme has recently 
undergone a substantial geographical expansion. These features make Ethiopia a particularly 
topical case study for assessing the redistributive role of taxes and social protection, both 
considering their current form and future reforms.  
The simulation results suggest that both taxation and social protection have a negligible role 
on the overall income distribution, as measured by the Gini index. This finding is consistent 
with other studies that show limited changes in the Gini index deriving from social grants (e.g. 
Samson et al. 2004, for South Africa) or even the fiscal system as a whole (see Chu et al. 
2000, using a sample of developing and transition countries; see World Bank 2015a, for 
Ethiopia). Our further analysis shows that closing the poverty gap in Ethiopia is beyond the 
potential of the tax system, given the current income distribution. Results from the simulation 
model also show that income taxes can have non-negligible adverse effects on the poor, even 
when they are designed to be progressive. On the other hand, the PSNP has a substantial 
role to play in poverty reduction, both in its current form and, even more so, in a potentially 
expanded version of the programme.  
2 Background 
2.1 Income taxation in Ethiopia 
Tax revenue mobilization in Ethiopia is a key policy priority, as the country still has a tax to 
GDP ratio (13 per cent in 2013/14) lower than other low-income countries (about 15 per cent 
on average) (See Figure A1 in Appendix A). Direct taxes represent 35 per cent of the total tax 
take, although personal income taxes contribute only a third of that share, or about 11 per cent 
of total revenue (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Personal income taxes are applied to wage 
                                                 
3 Based on national accounts data on GDP at constant prices.  
4 In 2000, 56 per cent of the population fell below the US$1.25 poverty line. In 2011, 31 per cent were deemed poor using the 
same poverty metric (World Bank 2015a). 
5 Structural transformation refers to re-allocation of labour in the economy. Historically, as countries become rich labour moves 
out of agriculture into more productive sectors of the economy (Chenery and Syrquin 1975). 
6 This is well acknowledged by the government of Ethiopia. Its large-scale public investment programmes on agriculture, 
education, health and food-security (PSNP) have a strong redistributive role (World Bank 2015a).  
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earners and the self-employed.7 This paper focuses on personal income taxation for two 
reasons. The first one is that income taxes are the key tax policy tool to address equity and 
redistribution. Income taxes are more progressive than indirect taxes by design, because the 
rate at which they are levied increases with income. However, the debate on the distributional 
effects of indirect taxes, particularly the VAT, is not yet settled (see Emran and Stiglitz 2005). 
This major tax has been shown to be less regressive than its critics argue (Bird and Zolt 2005; 
IMF 2011) and indirect taxes are generally progressive in Ethiopia (Muñoz and Cho 2003; 
World Bank 2015a).8 Nonetheless, further substantial improvements in equity through indirect 
taxes may be difficult to achieve.9 Differentiated rates for VAT are normally not advised to 
avoid complexity, distortions, and even adverse effects on equity (IMF 2011).10 As far as trade 
tax reform is concerned, several considerations other than equity are at play—not least 
Ethiopia’s current negotiations to access the WTO. In this context, further increases in the 
already high taxes on imported goods seem unlikely. Therefore, in this paper we focus on 
income taxation as a policy tool to achieve greater equity and redistribution in the economy.  
The second reason to focus on income taxation is the new law that was adopted in July 2016, 
making it timely to assess its likely effects on progressivity and redistribution. The pre-2016 
income tax system was based on laws from 2002 (Proclamation 286/2002 and Regulation 
28/2002) that have been updated only marginally since then. In the past 14 years, the 
thresholds for personal income tax, applicable both on wage earners and the self-employed,11 
were dramatically eroded by inflation—an effect known as bracket creep. These thresholds 
should have increased five-fold to retain the real value they had in 2002. Most strikingly, the 
pre-2016 exempt threshold of 1,800 birr is well below the poverty line12 and the lowest 
government wage. The old, pre-2016, progressive income tax structure is summarized in 
Table 1.  
Responding to increasing concerns about the equity and appropriateness of the old income 
tax structure, the government adopted a new income tax law in July 2016. Among other 
provisions,13 the new law dramatically increased all income tax thresholds (see Table 2). The 
exempt threshold increased four-fold and it is now well above the poverty line. Other 
thresholds also increased substantially, but proportionally less. By doing this, the reform aimed 
to relieve the poorest from paying income tax and to generally decrease the tax burden for all, 
especially those on lower incomes. Moreover, it can also improve the perceived equity of the 
system, thus potentially encouraging compliance. Despite its important merits, however, it is 
worth noting that the 2016 reform fell short of substantially simplifying the income tax system, 
which still presents a more complex structure than other similar countries.14  
                                                 
7 Note that the self-employed include individual businesses, such as sole proprietorships, that can be large firms even if they are 
not incorporated.  
8 This progressivity is achieved thanks to VAT exemptions for basic food items as well as higher excises and custom duties for 
goods that are consumed proportionally more by higher-income households, such as commercial alcohol products and imported 
cars. 
9 However, tax administration can be much improved, with potential implications on overall equity. For example, the threshold for 
VAT registration, set at 500,000 birr since 2003, could be increased to exempt small businesses from cumbersome administrative 
procedures.  
10 Exemptions or differential rates are justified by the fact that the poor spend a greater proportion of their income on such goods. 
However, higher income households still receive a larger subsidy as the amount they spend on any good is larger than for poor 
households.  
11 Corporate businesses are subject to a flat 30 per cent tax rate and taxes on other types of income (e.g. from interest payments 
or capital gains) are also subject to flat rates.  
12 The Ethiopian national poverty line was estimated at 3,781 birr in 2010/11 (MoFED 2013). Due to high inflation over the last 
years, the current poverty line adjusted for inflation would be considerably higher.  
13 The new income tax proclamation represents a broad modernisation of the income tax system, with more detailed provisions 
on international taxation, changes in loss carry-forward provisions and reporting requirements, amongst several other innovations. 
In addition, the income tax proclamation will be issued along with a tax administration proclamation.  
14 For example, Ethiopia currently applies a structure of seven progressive rates, including the zero rate for the lowest incomes. 
Other countries in the region have fewer rates: Uganda has four and Kenya and Tanzania five while Rwanda has three rates.  
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2.2 Productive safety net of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia’s social protection efforts form a core part of the country’s response to food insecurity, 
poverty, and vulnerability. Ethiopia’s national social protection policy indicates that, although 
the country does not operate a comprehensive and integrated system, it does implement many 
social protection interventions. These are listed to cover social insurance programmes 
(pensions), access to basic social services (fee waivers), national nutrition programme and 
the Food Security Programme (MoLSA 2012). The latter includes PSNP, which can also be 
considered the cornerstone of social protection in Ethiopia. The programme has been in place 
for a decade and is one of the largest social protection interventions in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Slater and McCord 2013). 
The Government of Ethiopia started the implementation of the PSNP in 2005 with the support 
of international donors. The programme was developed in response to widespread food 
insecurity and continual need for emergency food relief by providing food-insecure households 
with a transfer in lenient times to avoid asset depletion and protect livelihoods (Slater and 
McCord 2013; van Uffelen 2013; Devereux et al. 2014). The two main components are a public 
works programme for households with labour capacity and a direct support element that 
provides direct cash or food transfers to households without labour capacity (Hoddinott et al. 
2013). Since its inception, the programme has been widely expanded,15 has undergone a 
number of reforms and has been subject to rigorous mixed methods programme evaluations 
(Wiseman et al. 2010).16 Currently the programme operates in selected food-insecure rural 
districts in six regions of the country: Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Region and Tigray.17 
The redistributive impacts of the social protection programmes such as the PSNP depend on 
two aspects: targeting and its impact on the beneficiaries. These two criteria are met in the 
PSNP. First, a number of different studies of PSNP’s implementation process indicate that the 
targeting is accurate (Coll-Black et al. 2012; Berhane et al. 2013; Berhane, Hirvonen, 
Hoddinott, et al. 2016; Simons 2016) meaning that transfers are generally received by 
households with fewer assets and at a higher risk of suffering food insecurity in areas in which 
the PSNP operates. The World Bank (2015a) estimates that 66 per cent of direct transfers are 
concentrated in the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution. This 66 per cent is well 
above the targeting performance in the average anti-poverty programme reported in Coady et 
al. (2004). However, there is scope to improve the geographical targeting of the programme: 
Hill and Porter (as cited in World Bank, 2015a) estimate that more than 50 per cent of the poor 
in Ethiopia reside in districts (woredas) in which the PSNP is not operational. 
Second, while the evaluations of the first phase of the programme showed little impact on the 
beneficiaries (Gilligan et al. 2009), the more recent evaluations show that the programme has 
reduced household food insecurity and distress sale of assets and increased household 
expenditures and uptake of agricultural inputs (Hoddinott et al. 2012; Berhane et al. 2014; 
                                                 
15 The population covered by the PSNP was 5.2 million in 2005, 7.2 million in 2006–07, 7.8 million in 2010 and 8.3 million in 2014. 
(Rahmato 2013; World Bank 2016). 
16 The programme is currently embarking on its fourth implementation phase. This new phase will bring considerable changes in 
organisational and implementation structures. In addition, the programme will expand to new areas and reach up to 10 million 
people (World Bank 2014). One of the key new features is nutrition-sensitivity, focused on behavioural change and care practices, 
with the aim of contributing to better health and nutrition outcomes (GFDRE 2014a, 2014b). The total budget for PSNP-4 will 
approximate US$3.6 billion with contributions from the Government of Ethiopia and 11 development partners: United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DfID), Irish Aid, the European Union, Canadian International Development Agency, 
Swedish International Development Agency, the Netherlands, Danish International Development Agency, the United States 
Agency for International Development, UN Children’s Fund, the World Food Program and the World Bank. (World Bank 2014).  
17 Currently the programme does not operate in the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar regions, nor in the two urban 
administrative areas: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. 
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Berhane et al. 2016).18 Moreover, using panel data estimation techniques, census data and 
multiple rounds of nationally representative household data for Ethiopia, Vargas Hill and 
Tsehaye (2014) estimate that since its implementation in 2005, the PSNP has reduced poverty 
by 0.5 percentage points each year.19 We are not aware of studies that look at PSNP’s impact 
on overall inequality in the country. 
3 Data and methods 
We construct a simple and static micro-simulation model to analyse the redistributive effects 
of income taxation and social protection in Ethiopia. The model is simple in at least two 
respects. First, it only simulates changes in personal income taxation (specifically, 
employment and self-employment incomes) and social protection. We do not vary any other 
tax or subsidy, therefore assuming that they remain the same while our policies of interest are 
adjusted. A more comprehensive incidence analysis of the whole fiscal system of Ethiopia can 
be found in World Bank (2015a). Second, our simple model does not incorporate behavioural 
responses to changes in tax or social protection policies.20 For example, it may well be that 
decreased effective tax rates lead to less tax evasion. Similarly, the removal of social 
protection benefits from households may encourage them to seek alternative income sources. 
Our model is not able to capture such second-round effects and incorporating them is not 
within the scope of this paper.  
Total income is formed of seven components: agricultural and non-agricultural wages, crop 
income, livestock income, income from self-employment, transfers and other income 
(e.g. incomes received from land and non-land assets). The tax reform simulations apply taxes 
on non-agricultural wages and incomes from self-employment. The total incomes are then 
recomputed using the net wage incomes and net incomes from self-employment, together with 
the other non-adjusted income components. The final step consists of re-computing the 
inequality and poverty measures using this new income aggregate. In what follows, we use 
the three different scenarios described in section 2.1: base scenario (gross incomes), pre-
2016 reform scenario and 2016-reform scenario. Since the survey (described below) does not 
allow us to distinguish between formal and informal incomes, the tax system is applied to all—
with the implicit assumption of zero evasion. However, we do not apply taxes to agricultural 
wages, assuming that they would, legally or illegally, be largely untaxed.21  
The social protection simulations follow a similar idea. We first calculate the total income that 
each household receives from PSNP. These incomes are then deducted from household total 
incomes. We then re-compute the inequality and poverty measures using this income net of 
PSNP. Finally, we also consider another scenario in which all PSNP funds captured in the 
survey are distributed equally among the poor in the country.22 
                                                 
18 The PSNP programme also has positive spillover effects to the non-recipient households as well as to rest of the economy. 
Using Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) methods, Filipski et al. 
(2016) estimate that the annual contribution of the PSNP to the real GDP is between 0.7 and 1.4 per cent. These spillover effects 
are mainly due to the public works component that builds and restores community assets (thereby increases agricultural yields) 
as well as through the income transfers to the recipients (that are used to buy food and non-food products). 
19 This estimate represents the direct effect of the safety net component of the programme. The authors’ regressions control for 
the sectoral composition of growth that capture the productive elements of the programme (see the previous footnote). 
20 Micro-simulation models that ignore behavioural responses of the economic agents are sometimes called arithmetical models 
in the literature (see Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006). 
21 Our results are almost identical when, instead of assuming zero taxation on agricultural incomes, we assume zero taxation in 
rural areas regardless of whether the income is generated in the agricultural or non-agricultural sector.  
22 It should be noted that the overall goal of the PSNP is to reduce food insecurity in the country, not poverty reduction—although 
these two often go hand in hand. 
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Table 3 summarizes the different simulation scenarios regarding the adjustments on different 
income components. Appendix B provides a more formal description of this. 
Our data come from the Ethiopian Socioeconomic Survey (ESS). ESS is a longitudinal survey 
conducted by the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank Living 
Standards Measurement Study—Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) team (CSA 
and the World Bank 2013, 2015). We use the second round (2013–14) of this panel survey 
that covered 5,469 households from all 11 administrative regions. The survey has a number 
of features that make it particularly suited for our task at hand. First, the survey includes 
detailed income modules that attempt to measure household incomes as accurately as 
possible. Second, the data set provides information about the social protection benefits that 
households receive. Finally, the survey is nationally representative covering both rural and 
urban areas of the country.23 Together these features permit us to conduct an integrated 
analysis of the tax and social protection policies in the country. 
Still, the usual caveats common to any household survey data apply. First, measuring income 
in a context where large part of the (agricultural) production is based on subsistence farming 
is difficult and subject to a large margin of error (Deaton 1997: 29–32). In addition, household 
surveys have a tendency to under-estimate incomes and altogether to miss top income 
earners in the society (Atkinson et al. 2011). These factors mean that incomes are measured 
with considerable error. These are serious concerns that make the use of income data less 
appealing also in our application. It is for these reasons that most low-income countries, 
including Ethiopia, rely on consumption data for their poverty and inequality estimates.  
In our case, the challenge of using consumption data is that the tax simulations require 
applying taxes on different income components.24 We attempt to solve this issue in the 
following way. First, we estimate the share of household total income coming from different 
income sources listed in Table 3. Second, we multiply these shares by the household’s total 
consumption dividing the household consumption into the seven components. Finally, we then 
apply taxes on the wage and self-employment components before re-constructing the total 
household consumption variable.25  
Our consumption variable is based on the consumption aggregate constructed by the LSMS-
ISA team.26 For income, we utilize the income aggregates constructed by the Rural Income 
Generating Activities (RIGA) project—a collaboration between the FAO, the World Bank and 
American University in Washington DC (Quiñones et al. 2009). All income and consumption 
values are expressed in per adult equivalent terms.  
The redistributive effects are measured through Gini coefficient and different poverty indices.27 
The Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of income inequality. The Gini coefficient 
computes the difference between all available income pairs in the data and calculates the total 
of all absolute differences. This total is then normalized by dividing it by population squared 
times mean income. The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 means perfect 
                                                 
23 We use survey weights provided with the ESS data to make our estimates nationally representative. 
24 In Ethiopia, taxes are calculated separately for different types of incomes, such as wage and self-employment, rather than 
being applied to the aggregate income amount. The implication is, for example, that a taxpayer with two types of income will be 
able to benefit from the exempt amount twice.  
25 Note that, by doing this, we might overestimate the total tax payments for those households that have more than one wage 
earner and/or one self-employed. By taxing those incomes at the household level as a sum, rather than separately, we apply a 
higher marginal rate and only one exempt threshold. However, the majority of households in our data have only one wage earner 
and/or one self-employed.  
26 The total household consumption is measured using detailed food and non-food consumption-expenditure modules. The recall 
period in the food module was the last seven days while for non-food expenditures it was either the last month or the 12 months, 
depending on the item. Before totalling, all individual consumption-expenditure values are expressed in annual terms. 
27 We use the user-written ‘egen_inequal’ (Lokshin and Sajaia 2006) and ‘fastgini’ (Sajaia 2007) routines in Stata 14 to compute 
our poverty and inequality (Gini coefficient) measures, respectively. 
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equality (all individuals earn the same) and 1 refers to maximum inequality (1 person earns all 
the income in the country). We also use Lorenz curves to present the overall income inequality 
under the various simulation scenarios. The graphical presentation of the Lorenz curve 
involves a vertical axis that measures cumulative income and a horizontal axis that captures 
cumulative population in the country. A 45-degree line in this graph represents perfect equality; 
the Gini coefficient equals 0. In contrast, a Lorenz curve that lies flat over the horizontal axis 
until the last person and vertical for the last person in the population is called the line of perfect 
inequality. This is the case when the Gini coefficient equals 1. Typically, the estimated Lorenz 
curve lies between these two extremes. As the foregoing suggests, the Lorenz curve and the 
Gini coefficient are inter-linked: the Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the 45-
degree line and the estimated Lorenz curve and the area between the 45-degree line and the 
line of perfect inequality. 
The disadvantage of the Gini coefficient is that it only measures overall inequality in the 
country. Policy makers in low-income countries are often more interested in the poorest 
segment of the society. This motivates us to also simulate impacts on poverty. For this, we 
use the Foster et al. (1984) class of poverty measures, namely the poverty head count index, 
the poverty gap index, and the poverty severity index. Poverty head count (P0) captures the 
fraction of individuals that fall below the poverty line. The poverty gap index (P1) measures 
the aggregate poverty deficit of the poor relative to the poverty line. Finally, the poverty severity 
index (P2) captures the (squared) proportional shortfall from the poverty line. The key to this 
exercise is how the poverty line is defined.28 This is somewhat problematic as the ESS survey 
was not originally designed to accurately measure poverty in the country.29 We solve this issue 
by calibrating our poverty line so that the poverty headcount in the data matches the official 
estimate (GFDRE 2012)—30 per cent.30 
4 Results 
Table 4 provides the results based on the consumption data, while those based on income 
data are reported in Table A2 in Appendix A. Each Gini coefficient and poverty estimate is 
reported with respect to the base scenario—that is before taxes and after social protection 
payments. Column 1 shows the estimated impacts of the pre-2016 tax scheme. About 27 per 
cent of the population (19 per cent of the rural and 80 per cent of the urban population) is 
subject to income taxes under this scheme. According to our simulation estimates, the 
previous tax scheme had little redistributive impact: the Gini coefficient falls by 0.016 points 
but poverty does not decrease. In contrast, the headcount poverty rate is estimated to increase 
by one percentage point. This is a sizeable increase in poverty, likely due to out-dated 
thresholds that were set in the income tax law of 2002 and never revised until the 2016 reform. 
Under the old system, the exempt threshold was 1,800 birr (annual income), which is well 
below both the official and our calibrated poverty line. This means that the poor were still liable 
to pay income taxes—a result consistent with the findings of the fiscal incidence analysis of 
the World Bank (2015a). This World Bank study shows that, although income taxes are more 
progressive than indirect taxes, the poor in Ethiopia are still taxed more heavily than in other 
countries. Most importantly, according to the World Bank estimates, one in ten households is 
impoverished as a result of the combined effect of taxation and the benefit system. In those 
                                                 
28 The calculation of the official poverty line in Ethiopia is based on the cost of basic needs method and takes into account both 
food and non-food requirements (GFDRE 2012).  
29 The Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) serves as the official source for poverty statistics in the country. The 
consumption modules in the HCES are much more extensive than in ESS. As a result, the aggregate consumption values may 
not be entirely comparable.  
30 More specifically, this calibration is done by sorting the population by consumption (or income) and selecting the consumption 
(income) level capturing the 30th percentile in the (weighted) sample as the poverty line. This automatically yields a poverty 
headcount rate of 30 per cent.  
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households, taxes are larger than benefits, therefore pushing them into poverty or making 
those who are already poor, even poorer (World Bank 2015a). Higgins and Lustig (2016) 
document similar fiscal impoverishment in a number of other low-income countries. 
Column 2 in Table 4 reports the estimated impacts of the July 2016 income tax scheme. 
According to our survey data, nearly 18 per cent of the population (11 per cent of the rural and 
74 per cent of the urban population) is subject to income tax under this scheme. This is a 
considerable decrease in the number of taxpayers, from 27 per cent under the pre-2016 
scenario. This reduction is mostly due to the four-fold increase in the exempt threshold, which 
resulted in relieving the poorest from paying any income tax at all. Similar to the previous 
scheme, this scenario also yields negligible redistributive effects in terms of change in the Gini 
coefficient. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that the Lorenz curves lie virtually on top of each other 
under each scenario (base, pre-2016 and post-2016).  The adjustment in the first tax bracket 
means that we no longer see such a drastic increase in the poverty headcount rate as under 
the previous scheme. Therefore, it seems that the reform successfully corrected the distortions 
of the previous system and re-aligned income taxation with the broad policy objective of 
poverty reduction.  
The attention now shifts to the social protection analysis. About 10 per cent of the population 
receive PSNP benefits in our data.31 Column 3 shows the estimated effect of removing PSNP 
on overall inequality and poverty. Our models suggests that PSNP has considerable effect on 
poverty, reducing it by 0.9 percentage points.32 This figure, taken together with the tax 
simulation, implies that the poverty reducing effect of the PSNP was essentially cancelled out 
by the pre-2016 tax system that increased poverty by a similar amount. However, our 
simulations show that the programme results in no change in the Gini coefficient. 
The last column of Table 4 reports the estimates based on a scenario in which all PSNP funds 
are distributed equally among those who fall below the poverty line. This hypothetical 
redistribution makes two changes with respect to the PSNP, as currently implemented in 
Ethiopia. First, by re-assigning all funds to the poorest, we assume perfect targeting based on 
income. Although the PSNP has performed well in terms of targeting (see section 2.2), its 
limited geographical coverage means that many poor households are not covered by the 
programme (Hill and Porter, as cited in World Bank, 2015a). As a result, our hypothetical 
redistribution involves re-channelling PSNP funds also to the districts where it is not currently 
operational. This perfect re-targeting of the PSNP suggests considerable poverty impacts, as 
the programme now reaches the poor regardless of their location. Indeed, according to our 
model estimates, the re-allocated PSNP results in a fall of the headcount poverty rate by 1.5 
percentage points, a larger change than the current programme (see Column 3). However, 
the estimated change in overall inequality (Gini coefficient) remains small. This finding is 
further supported by the Lorenz curves that lie perfectly on top of each other under the base 
and different PSNP scenarios (Figure 2). This is possibly due both to the relatively small per 
capita amounts involved in the programme and to a relatively small number of beneficiaries 
that can be reached based on current financing.33  
Finally, using income instead of consumption data yields qualitatively very similar results (see 
Table A2 in Appendix A), thus confirming the robustness of our results.  
                                                 
31 This is close to official figures according to which 8.29 million individuals (out of the total population of 89 million) benefitted 
from PSNP in 2014 (World Bank 2016). 
32 Of note is that this estimate is somewhat higher than the one by Vargas Hill and Tsehaye (2014) according to which, since its 
implementation in 2005, the PSNP has reduced poverty by 0.5 percentage points per year. 
33 Note that we are simply re-targeting current PSNP resources, therefore all the simulations assume a constant overall PSNP 
budget.  
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5 Ethiopia’s capacity for redistribution and 
poverty reduction through income taxation 
Our simulation results suggest that taxation post-2016 has no impact on poverty, while it 
actually had adverse effects pre-2016. In contrast, social protection holds more promise in 
terms of poverty reduction. Still, taxation has an important role in two respects. First, the tax 
system needs to be kept updated, to avoid adverse effects similar to those resulting from 
bracket creep under the pre-2016 system. Second, it is an important source of revenue for 
social protection, both currently and potentially. This leads us to wonder whether the current 
tax scheme would be, in theory, able to actually generate enough revenues to finance PSNP 
without donor support. This section attempts to respond to this question. Moreover, following 
Ravallion (2010), we also assess Ethiopia’s capacity to close the poverty gap through taxation.  
The PSNP budget was 3.9 billion birr34 in 2013/14—the year of our analysis. The PSNP is 
currently financed almost entirely by donors (99 per cent), with a small contribution from 
domestic revenues. The PSNP budget compares with total domestic revenue35 of about 106 
billion birr in the government budget for the same year.36 Therefore, if the PSNP were fully 
funded through domestic revenue, it would absorb 3.7 per cent of such budgeted revenue. 
The government budget has increased at a high pace in recent years, with an approved budget 
for the fiscal year 2016/2017 of over 274 billion birr (nominal). Although full domestic financing 
of the PSNP would certainly require a substantial additional expense and re-allocations across 
expenditures, it may not seem completely unrealistic. However, a more accurate assessment 
requires closer consideration of the revenue generating capacity of specific tax types, which 
we attempt to provide next.  
To assess the distributive capacity of Ethiopia, we follow the method proposed by Ravallion 
(2010). Essentially, he asks whether countries that are currently aid recipients would have 
enough capacity for redistribution to tackle poverty entirely through domestic redistribution—
quite aside from whether they would have the political will to do so. The measure for 
redistribution capacity is the marginal tax rate that would need to be applied on the rich37 to 
obtain sufficient revenue to either close the poverty gap or finance a basic income scheme. If 
the necessary marginal rate would be ‘too high’, then that country does not have enough 
capacity for redistribution without aid. Clearly, there is no clear threshold for ‘too high’, 
although most high-income countries apply top marginal rates well below 60 per cent. 
Ravallion (2010) shows that in most low-income countries the marginal rate to cover even half 
of the poverty gap would indeed be prohibitive, while it may be more feasible in middle-income 
countries.  
We build on Ravallion’s method, but depart from it to adapt it to the Ethiopian context and 
make it more relevant to policy makers in the country. In terms of revenue needs, we consider 
both poverty eradication and the current PSNP financing. Moreover, we evaluate Ethiopia’s 
capacity for redistribution based on incremental changes on the current tax system (post-
2016), with two implications. First, although we adjust the top rate, incomes under the top 
threshold are still taxed according to the post-2016 schedule. As a result, the overall tax 
burden in our case is higher than in Ravallion (2010). Second, we only consider additional 
revenue compared to post-2016 reform, rather than the total tax take. We think this is more 
                                                 
34 The total annual PSNP costs according to the Government Budget (2006 Fiscal Year in Ethiopian Calendar – 2013/14 in 
Gregorian calendar) are 3,906,449,780 birr. Total annual PSNP flows (public works + direct support payments) estimated from 
the ESS data are 2,501,495,568 birr.  
35 Total domestic revenue includes tax and non-tax revenue, but excludes foreign loans and grants.  
36 Total domestic revenue in the budget proclamation for EFY 2006 is 105,919,265,400 birr. 
37 The ‘rich’ in Ravallion (2010) are defined as those who would not be considered poor by rich countries. 
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realistic and policy-relevant, since the government would still have to fund all other existing 
commitments in the budget, in addition to the transfer needed for the PSNP or for eliminating 
poverty.  
Based on this adaptation of Ravallion’s method, we start by calculating the necessary amount 
of revenue that would be required to close the poverty gap, as we already know the total PSNP 
budget (3.9 billion birr). Based on our consumption data and our calibrated poverty line, we 
calculate the cost of eliminating poverty as follows. We first multiply the poverty gap index by 
the poverty line, thus obtaining the per capita average gap in monetary terms. This number is 
then multiplied by the number of people in Ethiopia. This yields a total cost of eliminating 
poverty of about 24.6 billion birr.38  
Based on these numbers, we assess whether there would be a feasible top marginal rate to 
cover the poverty gap (24.6 billion birr) and the PSNP budget (3.9 billion birr) in Ethiopia. Using 
the survey data and our simple microsimulation model, we estimate the revenue gains that 
would be obtained by applying various top marginal rates to the higher bracket in the post-
2016 tax system (above 130,000 birr).39 Figure 3 shows the revenue gains resulting from 
increasing the top marginal rate above the current 35 per cent, calculated as additional 
revenue from the post-2016 scenario. However, in doing this we are abstracting from the cost 
of the 2016 reform that, by decreasing the effective tax rate on everyone, generates some 
revenue losses—which may, however, be counterbalanced by behavioural responses.40  
Figure 3 shows that, based on consumption data, Ethiopia could cover the cost of PSNP by 
applying a top rate slightly below 70 per cent, on incomes above 130,000 birr. Covering the 
poverty gap instead is impossible as even halving poverty would require top rates that are well 
above 100 per cent. If we use income data as an alternative for this analysis, no top rate would 
be sufficient to generate sufficient revenue for either target (see Figure A2 in Appendix A).41 
The conclusions using our two variables therefore seem to differ to some extent. However, we 
argue in the next paragraphs that the key message would be the same, namely that full 
domestic financing is not feasible. This is because a top rate of 70 per cent is far from realistic 
in practice, for a number of reasons.  
First, it is useful to put the top threshold of 130,000 birr in perspective. This amount is currently 
equivalent to less than US$6,000 per year, which corresponds to PPP US$51 per day.42 This 
value is substantially higher than the new World Bank’s poverty line of PPP US$1.9 per day. 
Following Ravallion (2010), it is worth noting that this value is also above the US poverty line 
of US$16.43 However, a household of four relying only on one wage of 130,000 birr would still 
be below the US poverty line (51/4 = PPP US$13)—thus raising concerns about setting a high 
                                                 
38 The per capita cost of eliminating poverty is calculated based on our consumption variable. The total cost is obtained as: 
Poverty Gap Index * Poverty line * Total population  = 25,301,477,020 birr. The equivalent figure based on income data is 
24,589,709,884 birr (see Table A2 in Appendix A for full results using income).  
39 As noted in other parts of this paper (for example, see section 3), this exercise comes with at least two caveats. First, we make 
the unrealistic assumption of no informal sector and no evasion. This would result in overestimating the revenue gains. Second, 
since the survey misses the rich and generally underestimates incomes, the revenue gains may be underestimated. These two 
caveats operate in different directions so it is hard to know how the real picture differs from the simulations. For this reason, this 
is not a prediction of what would happen by increasing the top rate, but rather a discussion on hypothetical capacity to fund 
redistribution domestically, under assumptions that we fully recognize as unrealistic.  
40 Behavioural responses to a decrease in the effective tax burden would increase tax revenue, for example by decreasing evasion 
and avoidance.   
41 While with consumption the two targets were hypothetically achievable with a 70 and 90 per cent top rate, using income there 
is no feasible top rate. This difference in the consumption (Figure 3) and income (Figure A2) results are likely due to the fact that 
income is grossly under-reported in the survey data, especially at the top part of the income distribution (see the discussion in 
Section 3).  
42 130,000 birr correspond to PPP US$18,665, based on the World Bank PPP conversion factor tables available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP. Therefore: 18,665 / 365 = 51 birr per day.  
43 This is the per capita daily poverty line for a family of four in 2014, based on the guidelines of the US Department of Health and 
Human Services.  
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tax rate on incomes that may still accrue to households can be considered middle-income or 
even poor by international standards. Second, a top marginal rate of 70 per cent would imply 
a jump of 40 percentage points moving to the top threshold. This would create considerable 
incentives for taxpayers to bunch just below that threshold—a behaviour documented in the 
literature even with much smaller discontinuities in the tax system (Saez 2010; Almunia and 
Lopez Rodriguez 2015). As a result of such behavioural responses, the real revenue gains of 
increasing the top rate would be likely to be substantially smaller. Third, the rate needed to 
cover the PSNP would be higher than the ones applied in most rich countries, which are 
typically below 60 per cent (Immervoll 2004). In the specific context of Ethiopia, there would 
be an additional political and historical connotation to such prohibitive rates, as the socialist 
military regime known as the Derg, which ruled the country until 1991, applied rates as high 
as 89 per cent (Griffin 1992; Chole 2005). Furthermore, high tax rates would almost certainly 
be politically unfeasible and would go against the efforts of many countries, particularly in 
Africa, to be fiscally competitive. Additionally, due to our assumptions on the informal sector, 
the revenue gains estimated here should be taken as an upper bound.  
For all these reasons, we believe that Ethiopia does not currently have the capacity to fund 
poverty eradication or the PSNP with income taxation alone. This is consistent with the 
broader result for low-income countries presented by Ravallion (2010).  
However, it is worth noting that increases in tax revenue do not necessarily need to come from 
higher marginal rates on wages and the self-employed. Taxpayers in these two categories still 
represent a relatively small share of the labour force in many low-income countries, which 
typically rely much less on personal income taxes than high-income countries. There are other 
taxes whose potential is still untapped. Most notably, incomes related to real estate are largely 
untaxed in many low-income countries, including in Ethiopia (see Goodfellow 2015). However, 
they are an important way to generate income and store wealth, particularly in countries with 
limited financial development. Moreover, corporate tax holidays that are generously granted 
to investors in Ethiopia, as in many other low-income countries, generate large revenue losses 
despite being of doubtful effectiveness (Kinda 2014). A detailed discussion of these taxes is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
6 Concluding discussion 
This paper aimed to address two related questions. First, we ask: what is the comparative 
effectiveness of income taxation and social protection in addressing poverty and inequality in 
Ethiopia? We find that currently the PSNP is more effective than income taxation in achieving 
poverty reduction, while neither policy achieves any sizeable reduction in overall inequality 
(measured through the Gini coefficient). Overall, our findings provide support for the common 
belief that social spending is more suitable than taxation to achieve redistribution. However, 
our results present a more nuanced picture that partly challenges this common belief. By 
analysing the pre-2016 tax system, we show that income taxation can actually have 
substantial adverse effects on poverty. In Ethiopia, this resulted from the combined effect of 
high inflation and a lack of revision of tax thresholds for 14 years, which led to a gradual and 
sustained increase in effective tax rates without corresponding increases in real income. This 
adverse effect, pre-2016, completely cancelled out the poverty reduction effect of the PSNP. 
Therefore, while our analysis reinforces the importance of social protection, it also shows that 
taxation can have a direct redistributive effect, not necessarily positive, in addition to being a 
key generator of domestic revenue.  
Second, we asked whether Ethiopia would have the capacity to achieve the desired level of 
redistribution by applying higher marginal rates on relatively high incomes. Building on the 
method used by Ravallion (2010), we argue that Ethiopia does not currently have the capacity 
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to close the poverty gap or fund the PSNP using domestic redistribution alone. Although some 
of our calculations would suggest that a top tax rate of 70 per cent could generate enough 
revenue to fund the PSNP, we argue that these revenue gains could be counter-productive 
and would be unlikely to actually materialize in practice (see section 5).  
This study has some important limitations. The first one is related to the data. Although we 
use alternative measures of income from our survey, we are aware of the limitations described 
in section 3. Nonetheless, we believe these data can still be used as a sufficiently realistic 
representation of reality to carry out our simple simulations. However, the analysis presented 
here should be taken more as a conceptual exercise, rather than generating specific and 
actionable policy recommendations. The second limitation lies in the simplicity of our 
microsimulation model, which only considers two specific policies, rather than the fiscal system 
as a whole, and excludes behavioural and second round effects. Therefore, the estimated 
changes in inequality or poverty rates should not be interpreted as representing causal effects 
of changing tax or social protection policies. Finally, since we do not have information on 
whether incomes are formal or informal, we have to make the assumption of no evasion and 
no informal sector. We fully recognize that this assumption is unrealistic, in a context like 
Ethiopia where the informal sector is estimated to represent over 35 per cent of the economy 
(Schneider and Williams 2013). However, by looking at variations under different scenarios, 
we believe we can still draw some general conclusions and insight into the potential of tax and 
social protection policies.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results are in line with the findings of similar studies in 
the literature, which also support the validity of our analysis. First, the PSNP seems to perform 
well and it could be usefully expanded to areas that are currently excluded. Our basic 
simulations show that even re-targeting to the population below the poverty line, while keeping 
the same total budget, can increase its effectiveness towards poverty reduction. Second, our 
analysis suggests that income taxation may turn regressive if the tax brackets are not regularly 
adjusted to keep up with inflation. This is particularly important in countries characterized by 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Progressive tax structure pre-2016 reform (2002 laws) 
Bracket From birr To birr Rate  
0 0 1,800 Exempted 
1 1,801 7,800 10% 
2 7,801 16,800 15% 
3 16,801 28,200 20% 
4 28,201 42,600 25% 
5 42,601 60,000 30% 
6 Over 60,000  35% 
Note: Thresholds of yearly income. 
Source: Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2002) Proclamation 286/2002  
 
Table 2: Progressive tax structure in the 2016 reform 
Bracket From birr To birr Rate  
0 0 7,000 Exempted 
1 7,001 19,300 10% 
2 19,301 37,750 15% 
3 37,751 62,350 20% 
4 62,351 93,100 25% 
5 93,101 130,000 30% 
6 Over 130,000  35% 
Note: Thresholds of yearly income.  




Table 3: Description of the simulation scenarios 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 




No PSNP Re-targeted 
PSNP 
Agricultural wages X X X (3) (4) 
Non-agricultural wages X (1) (2) X X 
Crop income X X X X X 
Livestock income X X X X X 
Income from self-employment X (1) (2) X X 
Transfers X X X (3) (4) 
Other income X X X X X 
Note:  X = As it is estimated from the survey. (1) = net of taxes (pre-2016 scheme). (2) = net of taxes (post-2016 
scheme). (3) =net of direct support and public works payments. (4) =PSNP redistributed equally among those 
who fall below the poverty line. 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
 
 
Table 4: The estimated impacts under each scenario with respect to the base scenario using consumption data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-2016 tax Post-2016 tax No PSNP 
Re-targeted 
PSNP 
Gini coefficient -0.016 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 
Pov 0 1.0 %p 0.2 %p 0.9 %p -1.5 %p 
Pov 1 0.3 %p 0.1 %p 0.4 %p -0.8 %p 
Pov 2 0.1 %p 0.0 %p 0.3 %p -0.5 %p 
Note: %p refers to percentage point. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ESS-LSMS 2013/14 survey. 
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Figure 1: Lorenz curves under base, pre-2016 and post-2016 scenarios 
 




Figure 2: Lorenz curves under base, pre-2016 and post-2016 scenarios 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ESS-LSMS 2013/14 survey.  
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Figure 3: Top marginal rate needed to eliminate poverty or fund the PSNP 
 
Note: The revenue gains in this figure are calculated based on our consumption variable.  




APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure A1: Tax to GDP ratio comparisons 
 
Note: The vertical axis measures the tax to GDP ratio.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ICTD GRD dataset (May 2016). 
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Figure A2: Top marginal rates and revenue gains using income data 
  
Note: The revenue gains in this figure are calculated using income data.  




Table A1: Tax composition in 2013/2014 
Tax type % total tax % direct tax % indirect tax % trade tax 
Business profits 21.5 61.9   
Sales/excise/VAT on trade 17.6   49.7 
Sales/excise/VAT on services 15.5  52.1  
Sales/excise/VAT on goods 13.7  45.8  
Custom duties 11.3   31.9 
Personal income taxes 10.2 29.3   
Surtax on imports 6.6   18.5 
Land fees 1.0 2.8   
Other income 0.9 2.6   
Stamp duties 0.6  2.1  
Rental income 0.6 1.6   
Interest income 0.3 0.8   
Agricultural income 0.2 0.7   
Capital gains 0.1 0.3   
 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on macroeconomic data from the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation.  
Table A2: The estimated impacts under each scenario with respect to the base scenario using income data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 pre-2016 tax 2016 scheme no PSNP PSNP, re-targeted 
Gini coefficient -0.025 -0.017 0.005 -0.005 
Pov 0 0.1 %p 0.0 %p 1.0 %p -1.7 %p 
Pov 1 0.1 %p 0.0 %p  0.7 %p -1.1 %p 
Pov 2 0.0 %p 0.0 %p 0.6 %p -1.1 %p 
Note: %p refers to percentage point, P0 to Poverty head count, P1 to poverty gap index (P1) and P2 to poverty 
severity index. 





APPENDIX B: FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE VARIOUS SIMULATION SCENARIOS  
‘Base’ scenario: 
Total income (totinc) is formed of agricultural (agwages) and non-agricultural wages 
(nonagwages), crop income (cropinc), livestock income (lsinc), income from self-employment 
(seinc), transfers (transf) and other income (othinc). The total income for the base scenario 
(i.e. before taxes and after PSNP) is estimated from the survey data as:  
(1) totinc = agwages + nonagwages + cropinc + lsinc + seinc + transf+ othinc. 
‘Pre-2016 tax’ scenario: 
In this scenario, we study the progressivity of the pre-2016 tax structure (see Section 2.1). To 
do this, we apply the tax structure (described in Table 1) on non-agricultural wages and income 
from self-employment: 
(2) totinc(a) = agwages + nonagwages(a) + cropinc + lsinc + seinc(a) + transf+ othinc,  
where nonagwages(a) and seinc(a)  refer to non-agricultural wages and income from self-
employment after taxes based on the pre-2016 tax structure, respectively. Finally, totinc(a) is 
the total income after taxes under pre-2016 tax structure. 
‘Post-2016 tax’ scenario: 
In this scenario, we study the progressivity of the oist-2016 tax structure (see Section 2.1). To 
do this, we apply the tax structure (described in Table 2) on non-agricultural wages and income 
from self-employment: 
(3) totinc(b)  = agwages + nonagwages(b) + cropinc + lsinc + seinc(b) + transf+ othinc,  
where nonagwages(b) and seinc(b)  refer to non-agricultural wages and income from self-
employment after taxes based on the post-2016 tax structure, respectively. Finally, totinc(b) is 
the total income after taxes under post-2016 tax structure. 
‘No PSNP’ scenario: 
In this scenario, we study what happens if PSNP is removed (see Section 2.2). To do this, we 
remove PSNP transfers from the data: 
(4) totinc(c)  = agwages(c) + nonagwages + cropinc + lsinc + seinc + transf(c)+ othinc,  
where agwages(c) and referstransf(c) refer to agricultural wages net of PSNP public works 
payments and all transfers received by households net of PSNP direct support payments, 
respectively. Finally, totinc(c) is then the total income net of PSNP. 
‘Re-targeted PSNP’ scenario: 
In this scenario, we study what happens if PSNP payments are re-distributed equally among 
those who fall below the poverty line. To do this, we again remove all PSNP payments from 
the data but now re-destribute these funds equally among those who fall below the poverty 
line: 
(5) totinc(d)  = agwages(d) + nonagwages + cropinc + lsinc + seinc + transf(d)+ othinc,  
where agwages(d) and referstransf(d) refer to agricultural wages and public and private transfers 
after the re-targeting of PSNP, respectively. Finally, totinc(d) is then the total income after the 
re-targeting of PSNP. 
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